Recording Of Compass Point Mortgage Repurchase Call Available

We had a great turnout for the Compass Point call today on mortgage repurchase liability and I thought the questions and remarks of the various participants were interesting and informative.  For those of you who missed the call, you can access a recording by downloading the .wav file at http://audio3.confpro.com and use reference #2528811.  You can also dial 888.284.7564 and use reference #252811 to hear a replay of the call.

Thanks to Jason Stewart, Mike Turner and Chris Gamaitoni for putting this call together, having me on as the featured guest, and raising awareness about this important issue.  As more investors and media outlets become aware of the significant outstanding mortgage repurchase liability facing many of the largest banks, we can expect to see more of the owners of mortgage backed securities coming forward to enforce their rights and banks beginning to acknowledge this potential liability in their loss reserves.  All this points to an increase in mortgage buy back litigation on the horizon, and an eventual transfer of wealth from the banks that originated and securitized massive numbers of defective loans to the pension funds, mutual funds, and other ordinary investors who bought an interest in those loans in reliance on the banks’ representations regarding underwriting quality.


Keep an eye out for an article later this week on how many of the banks’ former friends in Washington have finally woken up to this issue, and changed their tunes, accordingly…

Posted in Compass Point, irresponsible lending, liabilities, litigation, public perceptions, rep and warranty, repurchase, reserve reporting | 3 Comments

Compass Point To Hold Call Addressing Mortgage Repurchase Risks

Compass Point Research & Trading, a registered broker/dealer and one of the leading financial research firms investigating Alt-A and subprime mortgage backed securities (MBS), will be hosting a conference call to discuss mortgage repurchase risks.  The call will be held on Tuesday, August 31, 2010 at 1:00 P.M. Eastern and will be open to the public by using the following call-in number: 1-866-812-6491.  Jason Stewart, the Managing Director of Compass Point, will moderate the call and I have been invited to be the featured guest.  The plan is to have some prepared remarks, and then open up the floor to questions.   I would welcome the participation of any of my readers.

Compass Point issued a report on August 17, 2010 that did a great job of attempting to quantify the potential liability that banks are facing from private-label mortgage repurchase obligations.  The report cites to the Subprime Shakeout and discusses the potential impact of the FHLB lawsuits (prior articles here and here), the investor syndicate, the FHFA subpoenas, the mortgage insurance lawsuits against Countrywide in New York State Court, the Greenwich Financial lawsuit against Countrywide, and the recent involvement of the New York Fed in enforcing repurchase obligations.  The report recognizes that the real issue is access to loan files and that the investor syndicate may have amassed enough voting rights to compel servicers to turn these files over in a large number of trusts.  In short, Compass Point seems to have a firm understanding of the key issues and developments with respect to mortgage repurchase liability.

What’s the bottom line?  While Compass Point’s report provides best and worst case scenarios, it also takes a position as to the ultimate liability that the largest banks will face in connection with their origination of subprime and Alt-A mortgages during the 2005-2007 timeframe.  While these loss estimates may be conservative (they assume investors will only attempt to put back roughly 50% of loans, whereas from my experience, this number could be more like 75-80%), they are nonetheless significant: liability for Alt-A and subprime originations combined is estimated at $35.2 billion for Bank of America (based on the acquisition of Countrywide and Merrill Lynch) and $23.9 billion for JP Morgan (based on the acquisition of Bear Stearns).  The report goes on to note that there are serious questions over whether banks have adequately reserved for these losses, echoing the letter sent to JP Morgan this year by the SEC.

I am very much looking forward to this call on Tuesday, and hope that many of you will join.

Posted in BofA, Compass Point, Federal Home Loan Banks, Federal Reserve, FHFA, JPMorgan, liabilities, loan files, loss estimates, private label MBS, repurchase, research, reserve reporting | 4 Comments

New York Fed Throws Weight Behind Mortgage Buy Backs

As reported in Bloomberg, the Federal Bank of New York has announced that it is involved in “multiple efforts” to exercise its rights with respect to its holdings in faulty mortgages an other assets acquired through the bailouts of Bear Stearns and AIG.  The Fed holds nearly $70 billion in assets such as mortgage backed securities and collateralized debt obligations that were placed in holding companies established during the rescue of Bear and AIG in 2008.  BlackRock, which has led the charge among investors to force banks to absorb losses, is purportedly advising the Fed on its rights with respect to its holdings.  The Fed joins Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac among the federal regulators that have recently turned their attention to putting back defective loans to the banks that originated them, which in the Fed’s case includes Countrywide/BofA, Goldman Sachs, UBS and defunct lender New Century Financial.

Just last month, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, which oversees Freddie and Fannie, issued 64 subpoenas to loan servicers and securitization trustees seeking loan files underlying the securities bought by the GSEs. The GSEs reportedly held nearly $255 billion of mortgage related securities as of the end of May 2010.

As discussed in prior posts, loan originators generally sold loans into securitizations with extensive representations and warranties regarding underwriting methodology and compliance with strict guidelines designed to ensure the loan value and the borrower’s ability to pay were supported.  Where loan files underlying the mortgages in securitization reveal that those guidelines or underwriting methodologies were not followed, lenders have contractual obligations to repurchase the loans or substitute the loans with comparable performing mortgages. According to the Bloomberg article, violations of these reps and warranties cost the Big Four U.S. lenders about $5 billion last year, but that number is expected to skyrocket as more regulators and private investors jump on the put-back bandwagon.  These prospective losses have attracted the attention of the SEC, which issued a demand to JP Morgan in January for more disclosure on its repurchase liabilities.

Indeed, the holdings of the New York Fed and the GSEs in mortgage related securities constitute only a fraction of the $1.5 trillion private label bond market, and just over half of the pool represented by the Investor Syndicate, first introduced here and hereThe Syndicate fired its first warning shot across the bows of securitization trustees and servicers last month, and is expected to begin identifying specific breaches and enforcing its rights to documents and repurchases this month.  Various estimates from loan auditors have placed the percentage of deficient loans in 2005 to 2007 vintage private label securitizations anywhere from 40 to 90 percent (MBIA alleges in its complaint against Countrywide and BofA in Los Angeles County Court that it found deficiencies in 91% of the loans it reviewed in a particular sample).  If you do the math, that’s a massive amount of potential liability for the surviving subprime-era lenders.

The recent flurry of activity by federal regulators provides perfect political cover for the Syndicate and should grease the wheels of document production and lender cooperation.  It’s one thing to resist the efforts of a private consortium representing over one-third of the private label bond market.   It’s another to refuse compliance with the federal government.

In short, the concerted resistance to turning over loan files and servicing loans in accordance with bondholder wishes displayed by banks over the last year should begin to erode as banks realize that they can stall no longer.  Investors have clear rights to the documents underlying their investments, and to mortgage buy-backs where those documents reveal loan quality was deficient.  The problem up to now has been enforcing those rights.

Because the inherent strategy of a mortgage securitization was to spread out mortgage risk among a large pool of investors, no one private investor had the authority (or the incentive) to take action against the banks and force repurchases.  Generally, at least 25% of the asset class is required to petition the Trustee, and 50% is required to have a credible threat of firing the Trustee if it does not respond to entreaties for action.  Moreover, any benefit of a mortgage put-back would be dispersed among the entire pool of securities, or even several pools of securities, so the benefit to any one investor would be diffuse and freerider problems would abound.

Now that investors have organized, and have sufficient numbers and the proper incentives to take action, and now that federal regulators have joined the fray, I see the banks changing their strategy from one of postponing and delaying losses, to one of trying to resolve their repurchase liabilities through settlement.  Whether that’s a global settlement or a number of individual deals remains to be seen, but what is certain is that the major banks face a slew of lawsuits and a hefty repurchase tab if they don’t acknowledge their repurchase risk and take a seat at the negotiating table.

Posted in AIG, Bear Stearns, BlackRock, CDOs, Fannie Mae, Federal Reserve, Freddie Mac, freeriders, global settlement, incentives, Investor Syndicate, loan files, MBS, rep and warranty, repurchase, SEC | 1 Comment

Investor Syndicate Fires Warning Shot Across Trustee Bows

As first reported by Reuters on Wednesday, and as further detailed by Bloomberg today, the Investor Syndicate has finally begun to emerge from the shadows and give securitization trustees a hint at what’s coming.  According to Talcott Franklin, the Dallas attorney who is spearheading the Syndicate, the group sent letters to some of the major trustees of mortgage-backed securitizations, detailing the holdings of the group and urging trustees to help them enforce servicing breaches and pursue buybacks of improperly-originated loans.  The letters have not yet been made available, as the group appears to be continuing to closely guard the identity of the investors involved.

Franklin would only say that the members of the Syndicate are investors representing over $500 billion in mortgage-backed securities (MBS) holdings, which would account for over one-third of the $1.5 trillion private-label MBS market.  Franklin was formerly with the lobbying group of the Washington, D.C.-based law firm, Patton Boggs, that was involved in bondholders’ lobbying efforts over the Servicer Safe Harbor, but reportedly left the firm this year to head up the Investor Syndicate.

As discussed in prior posts (here and here), the Syndicate’s initial goal was to amass enough representation in a material number of securitizations to meet the 25% or 50% ownership thresholds imposed by the trust agreements, thereby acquiring the right to petition the trustees of those deals to take action.  From Franklin’s statements, it appears that this first step has been accomplished, as he has represented that the Syndicate owns bonds giving them 25% of “voting rights” in over 2,300 deals, 50% in more than 900 deals, and 66% of the bonds in more than 450 deals.

Assuming this is true, the letters sent on behalf of the Syndicate this week should be viewed as merely an opening salvo.  It is only a matter of time before the Syndicate begins issuing communications to trustees identifying specific instances of servicer misconduct or defects in the underwriting with respect to particular loans.  These instances of misconduct, also known as “defaults,” will change the responsibilities and incentives of the parties dramatically.  Once trustees are made aware of specific defaults by bondholders owning the requisite percentage of voting rights, the trustees become essentially fiduciaries of the bondholders, and acquire obligations to take steps to remedy those defaults.  Should they fail to do so, they may be fired or sued.

To those invested in the Big Four banks, which originated and now service huge percentages of the loans underlying these private-label securities, this next step will be the equivalent of yelling “fire” in a crowded movie theater.  Up to now, banks have been able to drag their collective feet in recognizing losses associated with the profligate lending practices of 2005-2007.  When banks originated mortgages and sold them into securitizations, they made representations and warranties regarding the quality of the underwriting and the guidelines they followed.  Should the Investor Syndicate be able to acquire the servicing and loan files associated with these mortgages and find breaches in those reps and warranties (as Freddie and Fannie are trying to do now through their subpoena powers), banks will be inundated with repurchase requests.  And as the media and government officials have only recently begun to recognize, banks have consistently under-reserved for the losses they will likely face from investor buyback obligations.

Further, in their role as servicers, these same banks have been slow to foreclose on hopelessly delinquent borrowers, as they were rife with conflicts of interest based on their second lien holdings.  Servicers have instead been content to rack up late fees while investors remained unorganized and the normally passive securitization trustees had no incentive to act.  Without active trustee enforcement of servicing obligations, the banks have also been able to modify loans as they pleased, irrespective of whether such workouts were in the best interests of bondholders, because trustees would not enforce servicer obligations to obtain the approval of the investors (see articles on the Greenwich Financial lawsuit against Countrywide for more background on this issue).  However, once trustees are compelled to go after these servicing breaches (or are fired and replaced by friendly trustees if they don’t), the banks will be liable for additional losses caused by their failure to service loans in accordance with bondholder wishes.

All this is to say that the financial landscape will change drastically in the coming month as the Investor Syndicate moves forward with its plans.  To drop a shameless Counting Crows reference, the MBS world may look very different in “August and Everything After.”

Posted in fiduciary duties, firing servicers, Investor Syndicate, irresponsible lending, private label MBS, repurchase, reserve reporting, securitization, servicer defaults, Servicer Safe Harbor, Trustees | 13 Comments

Loan File Issue Brought to Forefront By FHFA Subpoena

The battle being waged by bondholders over access to the loan files underlying their investments was brought into the national spotlight earlier this week, when the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), the regulator in charge of overseeing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, issued 64 subpoenas seeking documents related to the mortgage-backed securities (MBS) in which Freddie and Fannie had invested.  The FHFA has been in charge of overseeing Freddie and Fannie since they were placed into conservatorship in 2008.

Freddie and Fannie are two of the largest investors in privately issued bonds–those secured by subprime and Alt-A loans that were often originated by the mortgage arms of Wall St. firms and then packaged and sold by those same firms to investors–and held nearly $255 billion of these securities as of the end of May.  The FHFA said Monday that it is seeking to determine whether issuers of these so-called “private label” MBS misled Freddie and Fannie into making the investments, which have performed abysmally so far, and are expected to result in another $46 billion in unrealized losses to the Government Sponsored Entities (GSE).

Though the FHFA has not disclosed the targets of its subpoenas, the top issuers of private label MBS include familiar names such as Countrywide and Merrill Lynch (now part of BofA), Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual (now part of JP Morgan Chase), Deutsche Bank and Morgan Stanley.  David Reilly of the Wall Street Journal has written an article urging banks to come forward and disclose whether they have received subpoenas from the FHFA, but I’m not holding my breath.

The FHFA issued a press release on Monday regarding the subpoenas (available here).  The statement I found most interesting in the release discusses that, before and after conservatorship, the GSEs had been attempting to acquire loan files to assess their rights and determine whether there were misrepresentations and/or breaches of representations and warranties by the issuers of the private label MBS, but that, “difficulty in obtaining the loan documents has presented a challenge to the [GSEs’] efforts.  FHFA has therefore issued these subpoenas for various loan files and transaction documents pertaining to loans securing the [private label MBS] to trustees and servicers controlling or holding that documentation.”

The FHFA’s Acting Director, Edward DeMarco, is then quoted as saying ““FHFA is taking this action consistent with our responsibilities as Conservator of each Enterprise.  By obtaining these documents we can assess whether contractual violations or other breaches have taken place leading to losses for the Enterprises and thus taxpayers. If so, we will then make decisions regarding appropriate actions.”  Sounds like these subpoenas are just the precursor to additional legal action.

The fact that servicers and trustees have been stonewalling even these powerful agencies on loan files should come as no surprise based on the legal battles private investors have had to wage thus far to force banks to produce these documents.  And yet, I’m still amazed by the bald intransigence displayed by these financial institutions.  After all, they generally have clear contractual obligations requiring them to give investors access to the files (which describe the very assets backing the securities), not to mention the implicit discovery rights these private institutions would have should the dispute wind up in court, as it has in MBIA v. Countrywide and scores of other investor suits.

At this point, it should be clear to everyone–servicers and investors alike–that the loan files will have to be produced eventually, so the only purpose I can fathom for the banks’ obduracy is delay.  The loan files should, as I’ve said in the past, reveal the depths of mortgage originator depravity, demonstrating convincingly that the loans never should have been issued in the first place.  This, in turn, will force banks to immediately reserve for potential losses associated with buying back these defective mortgages.  Perhaps banks are hoping that they can ward off this inevitability long enough to spread their losses out over several years, thereby weathering the storm caused (in part) by their irresponsible lending practices.  But certainly the FHFA’s announcement will make that more difficult, as the FHFA’s inherent authority to subpoena these documents (stemming from the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008) should compel disclosure without the need for litigation, and potentially provide sufficient evidence of repurchase obligations to compel the banks to reserve right away.  For more on this issue, see the fascinating recent guest post by Manal Mehta on The Subprime Shakeout regarding the SEC’s investigation into banks’ processes for allocating loss reserves.

Meanwhile, the investor lawsuits continue to rain down on banks, with suits by the Charles Schwab Corp. against Merrill Lynch and UBS, by the Oregon Public Employee Retirement Fund against Countrywide, and by Cambridge Place Investment Management against Goldman Sachs, Citigroup and dozens of other banks and brokerages being announced this week.  If the congealing investor syndicate was looking for political cover before staging a full frontal attack on banks, this should provide ample protection. Much more to follow on these and other developments in the coming days…

Posted in Alt-A, Countrywide, Fannie Mae, FHFA, Freddie Mac, Investor Syndicate, irresponsible lending, loan files, MBIA, private label MBS, repurchase, reserve reporting, subpoenas, subprime, Wall St. | 1 Comment

When Fed Bailed Out A.I.G., Banks Were Given Immunity

The story just keeps getting worse as more details about Credit Default Swaps (CDS) emerge daily.  CDS were essentially side bets on the performance of other mortgage derivatives, such as mortgage backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDO).

From Michael Lewis’ The Big Short and other commentary, it was already well documented that A.I.G. was the counterparty on much of the CDS issued by Wall St., being one of the few large companies willing to take the long side of the bet on mortgage default risk.  Those selling mortgage default risk to A.I.G. had several risks to consider: 1) that mortgages would perform better than expected, 2) that mortgages would underperform but the counterparty on the trades (e.g., A.I.G.) would become insolvent and not be able to make good on the trades, and 3) that the counterparty would sue the bank issuing the CDS or underlying mortgage securities for fraud and misrepresentation in the creation of the instruments.

Up to now, Lewis and others, including the New York Times, had focused primarily on the second risk above in pointing out that the Fed’s bailout of A.I.G. had the primary effect of ensuring the solvency of the trading partner of big banks, so that they could collect on their bets against the mortgage market.  However, there is now a spotlight on the third risk above, after the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform released 250,000 pages of largely undisclosed documents showing that A.I.G. was forced to agree to waive its rights to sue several banks – including Goldman Sachs, Societe Generale, Deutsche Bank and Merrill Lynch – over irregularities in the mortgage securities it insured.  This fact is only made more appalling by the fact that many of the primary decisionmakers at the New York Fed (which oversees A.I.G. and presided over the bailout) were alumni of the banks that would benefit from this forfeiture, and some even still held stock in those financial institutions.

Sources indicate that this waiver prevents A.I.G. from suing to recover claims it paid on $62 billion worth of mortgage securities that it insured.

For more information, read the article published yesterday in the New York Times, entitled “In U.S. Bailout of A.I.G., Forgiveness for Big Banks.” It pretty much says it all, and if you are not shocked and outraged by what you read, you may want to have your pulse checked.

[Thanks to Manal Mehta for being the first to bring this story to my attention – IMG]
Posted in bailout, Uncategorized | Leave a comment

SEC Demands More Disclosure From JP Morgan on Repurchase Liabilities

By Manal Mehta, Guest Blogger
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recently took a much needed step towards improving the transparency of bank balance sheets, particularly when it comes to the adequacy of reserves for mortgage repurchase obligations stemming from banks’ violations of representations and warranties.
Due to findings of mortgage fraud and underwriting deficiencies in the mortgage origination process and  misrepresentation in the packaging of mortgages, banks have been experiencing a drastic increase in the number of repurchase demands they are receiving, including from Government-Sponsored Entities (“GSE”), monoline and mortgage insurers and other end purchasers of RMBS securitizations, such as the Federal Home Loan Banks.  Banks have responded by taking on additional reserves, which have had the effect of reducing mortgage income in the corresponding period.  Now, however, in a letter dated January 29, 2010, the SEC has asked JP Morgan to clarify its reserving methodology for mortgage put-backs—a process that has historically been opaque and difficult for outsiders to evaluate.
As an investor, I have long been concerned with whether the banks’ levels of reserves represent accurate reflections of their true liability.  Just to get a sense of the magnitude of this issue, in SEC v. Angelo Mozilo, the SEC alleges that Countrywide originated over $450 billion of mortgages annually during the boom years.  What percentage of those Countrywide mortgages were fraudulently originated?  What percentage are getting sent back for repurchase? Even a modest percentage could lead to substantial losses for Bank of America (“BofA”), Countrywide’s parent and potential successor in liability (see Subprime Shakeout post on recent ruling in MBIA v. Countrywide).
Additionally, there is some alarming evidence that BofA actually did assume the liabilities of Countrywide, and is thus on the hook for the liabilities of its subsidiary.  At the time of Bank of America’s purchase of Countrywide, Scott Silvestri, a Bank of America spokesperson is quoted as saying, “[w]e bought the company and all of its assets and liabilities.  We are aware of the claims and potential claims against the company and factored these into the purchase”  (emphasis added).  This led Florida Attorney General Bill McCollum, in announcing his intention to negotiate a settlement with Countrywide regarding predatory lending practices, to say, “there is technically a deep pocket.  They’ve [BofA] acquired them [Countrywide], they assume their liabilities.”
The SEC’s actions are very important in this debate over mortgage buybacks.  The SEC has asked JP Morgan to clarify its reserving methodology in the following five areas:
a)  The specific methodology employed to estimate the allowance related to various representations and warranties, including any differences that may result depending on the type of counterparty to the contract.
b)  Discuss the level of allowances established related to these repurchase requests and how and where they are classified in the financial statements.
c)  Discuss the level and type of repurchase requests you are receiving, and any trends that have been identified, including your success rates in avoiding settling the claim.
d)  Discuss your methods of settling the claims under the agreements. Specifically, tell us whether you repurchase the loans outright from the counterparty or just make a settlement payment to them. If the former, discuss any effects or trends on your nonperforming loan statistics. If the latter, discuss any trends in terms of the average settlement amount by loan type.
e)  Discuss the typical length of time of your repurchase obligation and any trends you are seeing by loan vintage.
The monoline insurers have constantly complained that banks have continued to be amenable to processing repurchase requests and repurchasing loans associated with Fannie and Freddie due to the necessity of continuing a business relationship with the GSEs.  They claim that for similar violations of rep & warranties, however, the mortgage originators have denied their repurchase requests.  This requirement from the SEC asking for clarification on discriminating between repurchase requests from the GSEs versus the monolines/other investors should have interesting consequences.  As Jay Brown, the CEO of MBIA, recently stated in the company’s Q1 2010 conference call, “we have discussed the process that Fannie and Freddie use with their folks to see how it compares to the process that we use both from examining the loans and also in terms of the accounting, and both approaches are consistent with our own.”
The SEC’s requirement to provide clarity on the counterparties to repurchase requests should lead to more fair treatment for the insurers.  The requirement to provide increased disclosure on mortgage putbacks from the insurers could also ratchet up the pressure on the banks to settle repurchase requests.  If they honor repurchase requests from Fannie and Freddie for very similar violations of reps & warranties but refuse to honor them for the insurers, continuing to litigate could lead to large damage claims for adverse rulings in court.
For investors who may not be aware of how significant of an issue this is for the banks, it is imperative to read the testimony of Richard Bowen in front of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission.  Dick Bowen was the Senior Vice President and Chief Underwriter for Correspondent Acquisitions for Citigroup Mortgage.  In early 2006, he was promoted to Business Chief Underwriter for Correspondent Lending in the Consumer Lending Group.  The numbers he cites in his testimony are astounding.  I will allow his testimony to speak for itself:
The delegated flow channel purchased approximately $50 billion of prime mortgages annually… In mid-2006 I discovered that over 60% of these mortgages purchased and sold were defective. Because Citi had given reps and warrants to the investors that the mortgages were not defective, the investors could force Citi to repurchase many billions of dollars of these defective assets. This situation represented a large potential risk to the shareholders of Citigroup…I started issuing warnings in June of 2006 and attempted to get management to address these critical risk issues. These warnings continued through 2007 and went to all levels of the Consumer Lending Group…We continued to purchase and sell to investors even larger volumes of mortgages through 2007. And defective mortgages increased during 2007 to over 80% of production. (emphasis added)
Digging through Citi’s public financials, it is unclear what reserves have been set aside to reflect the possibility of these noncompliant mortgages travelling back to Citi’s balance sheet.  The SEC’s recent letter to JP Morgan should provide increased disclosure for these types of liabilities lurking on bank balance sheets.

David Grais’s lawsuits on behalf of the Federal Home Loan Banks (“FHLB”) against investment banks involved in the packaging of RMBS securitizations that were bought by the FHLB also provide for interesting reading.  The Federal Home Loan Banks bought $23 billion of RMBS securitizations from a number of investment banks.  These structured products contained representations regarding maximum LTV ratios on the underlying mortgages.  In these lawsuits, the FHLBs of San Francisco (complaint available here) and Seattle (complaint available here) contend that widespread appraisal fraud led to incorrect LTV reps on the pools of mortgages purchased by the FHLBs.  They are suing to recover losses stemming from their purchases of these mortgage securities.  David Grais was a roommate of Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito for three years while they were undergraduates at Princeton University.  His legal credentials and ability to undertake complex litigation should not be underestimated.  

As Gretchen Morgenson writes in the New York Times, though disputes over losses from mortgage-backed securities are hard to litigate because investors must persuade factfinders that their losses were not simply the result of a market crash,
[r]ecent filings by two Federal Home Loan Banks — in San Francisco and Seattle — offer an intriguing way to clear this high hurdle. Lawyers representing the banks, which bought mortgage securities, combed through the loan pools looking for discrepancies between actual loan characteristics and how they were pitched to investors.
You may not be shocked to learn that the analysis found significant differences between what the Home Loan Banks were told about these securities and what they were sold.
The rate of discrepancies in these pools is surprising. The lawsuits contend that half the loans were inaccurately described in disclosure materials filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
These findings are compelling because they involve some 525,000 mortgage loans in 156 pools sold by 10 investment banks from 2005 through 2007. And because the research was conducted using a valuation model devised by CoreLogic, an information analytics company that is a trusted source for mortgage loan data, the conclusions are even more credible . . .
The model concluded that roughly one-third of the loans were for amounts that were 105 percent or more of the underlying property’s value. Roughly 5.5 percent of the loans in the pools had appraisals that were lower than they should have been.  That means inflated appraisals were involved in six times as many loans as were understated appraisals . . .
It is unclear, of course, how these court cases will turn out.  But it certainly is true that the more investors dig, the more they learn how freewheeling the Wall Street mortgage machine was back in the day.
Investors should take a hard look at bank balance sheets to understand the adequacy of reserves for this huge contingent liability.  It is not surprising that banks have stonewalled any attempt to get clarity on this issue – hopefully the SEC’s explicit demands from JP Morgan to increase their disclosure will have a knock-on effect for the others. 

Manal Mehta is a Principal at Branch Hill Capital, which invests in Special Situations.

Posted in balance sheets, BofA, Citigroup, Countrywide, Federal Home Loan Banks, guest posts, investors, JPMorgan, lawsuits, litigation, mortgage insurers, repurchase, reserve reporting, SEC | 1 Comment

Investor Syndicate At Hundreds of Billions And Growing

Heard on this Street this week: the super-secret Syndicate of MBS Investors discussed previously is gaining momentum.  A confidential source has informed me that some of the largest institutional investors in mortgage-backed securities have now joined the group, bringing the amount under management to “hundreds of billions of dollars in MBS investments.”  The source further informed me that this number is expected to swell to a “jaw-dropping dollar figure.”

As discussed before, the Syndicate hopes to amass enough representation in enough securitizations throughout the country to take over those trusts pursuant to the terms of the respective Pooling and Servicing Agreements (PSAs).  These contracts often require 25% class ownership to petition the Trustee to take action and 50% ownership to fire the Trustee or Master Servicer.

Once the Syndicate has reached critical mass, it reportedly will approach the Trustees of a number of deals to present evidence of Servicer misconduct and request the Trustee to take action to remedy Servicer breaches (including firing the Servicer).  If the Trustee does not comply, the Syndicate plans to fire the Trustee and Servicer, and install friendly institutions in their place.
At that point, the Syndicate would likely pursue two major courses of action: 1) take over the servicing of the deals and begin servicing the loans in the trust in accordance with bondholder wishes (including liquidating or modifying loans in default, depending on which option makes the most economic sense over the long term) and 2) pursue remedies against originators for losses caused to the pool.  This second prong would involve pouring over loan files obtained from the prior servicer to look for breaches of reps and warranties in the origination and underwriting of the loans.  This will almost certainly lead to a jump in mortgage litigation seeking to compel originators to buy back or repurchase loans that were improperly originated (to the extent these originators are still solvent).
Again, loan files are critical, because they reveal the fundamental characteristics of each loan and the underwriting determinations made in the approval of such loans.  Though certain plaintiffs have recently made strides towards forcing servicers like Countrywide to turn over loan files (see also Order Granting Motion to Compel in Syncora v. Countrywide), the acquisition of these all-important documents remains a difficult proposition.  Investors are increasingly coming around to the idea that the only way they will be able to obtain these files is by force–namely, firing Servicers and taking over their duties and documents.
I will continue to provide updates on this fascinating development as they become available, and expect that we’ll begin to hear more about the Investor Syndicate in the mainstream media in the coming months.  Stay tuned…
Posted in Countrywide, firing servicers, Investor Syndicate, investors, irresponsible lending, litigation, loan files, MBS, repurchase, servicers | 2 Comments

BofA and Countrywide Appeal Order Allowing MBIA Vicarious Liability Claim To Proceed

In a move that could have dramatic consequences for the financial stability of Bank of America (BofA), a New York state court judge has held that monoline bond insurer MBIA can go forward with claims that BofA be held vicariously liable for claims against its subsidiary, Countrywide.  BofA has already filed an appeal of the Order, issued by Judge Eileen Bransten in New York State Supreme Court in the case of MBIA v. Countrywide Home Loans, et al. Bransten held, among other things, that MBIA could proceed with its argument that BofA was vicariously liable for the debts of Countrywide as successor-in-interest, based on a claim of a de facto merger between the companies.

In the case, MBIA alleges that a significant percentage of tens of thousands of home equity lines of credit (HELOCs) and second-lien loans issued by Countrywide entities in various securitizations insured by MBIA failed to comply with Countrywide’s underwriting guidelines or other reps and warranties.  Bransten’s Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, issued on April 27, 2010, denied Countrywide and BofA’s motion to dismiss as to MBIA’s claims for fraud, breach of the implied covenant (though this claim was narrowed) and successor and vicarious liability against BofA, while granting the motion to dismiss as to MBIA’s claim for negligent misrepresentation.

The transcript of the oral argument surrounding this motion makes for particularly entertaining reading (at least for mortgage litigation nerds, such as myself).  In that hearing, David Apfel, counsel for BofA and Countrywide, argued that the successor liability claim was “frivolous,” and that MBIA should not be allowed even to pursue discovery regarding the issue.  Judge Bransten did not buy these arguments, denying BofA’s motion to dismiss as to the successor liability claim and ordering discovery to move forward.  Bransten also expressed significant dissatisfaction with the pace of the production of documents from BofA and Countrywide.  In response to Apfel’s statement that, “Countywide ha[s] been working hard [at discovery],” the Judge responded, “It’s not going well enough… Get discovery, documentary discovery done.”

This ruling came on the heels of another adverse ruling for Countrywide emanating from Bransten’s pen.  In a related case styled Syncora Guarantee, Inc. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., et al., Bransten ordered Countrywide to begin producing loan files underlying the delinquent loans in three securitizations insured by bond insurer, Syncora.  The Syncora case (along with MBIA v. Countrywide and FGIC v. Countrywide) is one of three related bond insurance cases involving BofA and Countrywide before Judge Bransten (note: bond insurers provide insurance on an entire securitization, or pool of loans, rather than on individual loans).  The acquisition of loan files, and servicers’ reluctance to turn over the same, is a critical issue for investors pursuing claims against originators and servicers for irresponsible lending practices in connection with the loans underlying the mortgage-backed securities they purchased.

Bill Frey, whose broker-dealer, Greenwich Financial Services, is the plaintiff in a lawsuit against Countrywide in New York state court, has been closely following the bond insurance litigation against Countrywide and BofA in New York.  He commented on Judge Bransten’s recent rulings that, “it sounds like [Judge Bransten] understands that you need to honor commitments and contracts if you are going to have an economy work.”  Frey’s suit, which seeks to force Countrywide to pay for the loan modifications it has agreed to perform in a settlement with the Attorney Generals from more than 30 states, awaits a ruling on Countrywide’s motion to dismiss.

Yet, while those with claims against Countrywide are watching this litigation closely, most of the mainstream media has been slow to recognize the significance of these decisions.  Certainly, if BofA is on the hook for the massive potential liabilities of Countrywide stemming from its years of volume lending, this could undermine Bank of America’s solvency, which, in turn, could have a dramatic ripple effect on the other major banks and the financial system as a whole.  BofA will have to take a stand, and whether or not this litigation is where BofA’s ultimate liability is determined, contesting Bransten’s vicarious liability ruling will be an important first battle.

Andrew Longstreth gets it.  In an April 29, 2010 article for AmLaw Litigation (subscription required), Longstreth notes that this is the first time a judge has allowed claims to proceed against BofA for the liabilities of Countrywide.  Longstreth quotes MBIA’s attorney, Phillip Selendy, as saying, “[the decision] is going to have an impact beyond this case.”  That could be the understatement of the year.

BofA/Countrywide filed the Notice of Appeal (available here) on May 28, 2010, indicating that it would be challenging the adverse portions of the April 27 ruling before the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, in and for the First Division.  BofA/Countrywide also filed a Pre-Argument Statement (available here) before the Appellate Court, in which it argued that Judge Bransten improperly applied New York law, rather than Delaware law, to determine the issue of successor liability, and that MBIA failed to allege, as required, that the merger between the companies “was engineered to disadvantage Countrywide’s shareholders or creditors.”  BofA/Countrywide further decried the fact that, since Bransten’s decision on vicarious liability, both FGIC and Syncora have amended their complaints against Countrywide to add BofA as a defendant.

This may be one of the primary reasons that BofA has chosen to pursue the risky strategy of appealing Bransten’s Order.  Though the ruling does not definitively hold that BofA and Countrywide entered into a de facto merger–it simply allows such a claim to move forward–BofA faces the prospect of other litigants being emboldened to bring claims against BofA wherever they have claims against Countrywide.  Though BofA runs the risk that, by appealing, it could suffer an adverse ruling at the hands of the Appellate Division of New York Supreme Court–a ruling that would have broader precedential value than Bransten’s Order–BofA has presumably decided to take an early stand in the hopes of cutting off the flood of litigation before it begins.

Yet, it is unclear whether BofA has as strong a case as it thinks.  The de facto merger exception to the general rule that an acquirer does not become responsible for the liabilities of the acquired corporation turns on whether the acquirer absorbs and continues the prior operations of the acquired corporation or dissolves the company’s management and general business operations.  MBIA has alleged facts showing that BofA retired the Countrywide brand, including its website, and cites favorable New York case law holding that all-stock acquisitions, such as BofA’s acquisition of Countrywide, suggest that a de facto merger has occurred.  MBIA also cites BofA’s pursuit of a settlement of predatory lending suits with state Attorneys General immediately following its acquisition as evidence of the cessation and dissolution of Countrywide’s business.

BofA’s primary argument on appeal appears to be that Bransten erred in applying New York law to the vicarious liability claim.  The bank argues that Bransten should have instead applied Delaware law, which is more favorable to acquirers wishing to avoid successor liability.  But the argument has the distinct feel of a Hail Mary, as it did not appear to be a focus in BofA’s briefs, and Apfel did not even raise it during oral argument on the motion.

In fact, Apfel repeatedly exhorted Judge Bransten to read an order from Judge Mariana Pfaelzer the Central District of California from the case Argent v. Countrywide, which Apfel described as featuring “the exact same facts” as MBIA. Bransten actually excoriated Apfel at one point to direct her towards a New York case, saying “please, please, there must be a New York case that we can rely on.  At least, give me some guidance” (see transcript at 41-42).  Apfel responded, simply, “[o]kay.”  Id. At no point did BofA’s counsel argue that Delaware law should actually apply.

Instead, Bransten appeared to become quite irritated at Apfel’s repeated entreaties for her to read Argent–again, a California case.  At one point, after Bransten asked Apfel to move on to his next argument and Apfel again asked Bransten to read Argent, Bransten responded, “as I stated before, I’m going to read it, all right.  I mean, you don’t have to remind me to read it… It’s only been the tenth time asking me to read it” (see transcript at 41-42).

Meanwhile, the MBIA litigation moves forward, and MBIA has filed a Motion to Compel, to force Countrywide to produce 1) delinquent loan files, 2) documents Defendants previously produced to various state Attorneys General in connection with their settlement with Countrywide, and 3) documents relating to BofA’s successor liability.  The Reply brief, filed June 8, is available here.  BofA and Countrywide will certainly fight hard to avoid turning over these critical documents.  But, judging by Judge Bransten’s recent opinions, and her palpable frustration with BofA’s discovery conduct, I don’t like the bank’s chances of avoiding this production.

[Many thanks to Manal Mehta for sharing many of the documents featured in this post – IMG]
Posted in Attorneys General, BofA, bondholder actions, Countrywide, Greenwich Financial Services, loan files, merger, mortgage insurers, predatory lending, settlements, successor liability, vicarious liability, William Frey | 10 Comments

Federal Short Sale Programs Will Face Same Shortcoming As Workouts: Too Much Carrot, Not Enough Stick

With government-backed loan modification programs showing abysmal results, Washington has turned to short sales as the flavor of the week to ameliorate the foreclosure crisis.  Pursuant to the Treasury Department’s Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternatives (HAFA) initiative, effective April 5, loan servicers will be offered a $1,500 cash incentive to enter into “short sales” with borrowers, meaning allowing underwater borrowers to sell their homes at less than the amount of the unpaid principal balance remaining on their loans.

Yet, this mechanism suffers from the same drawbacks as loan modification programs–namely, that the approval or cooperation of the servicer is required to complete the sale.  Due to their well-documented conflicts of interest, it is highly unlikely that servicers will voluntarily agree to write down principal on the loans they service, which would also involve writing down their junior lien holdings and foregoing their right to collect late fees from delinquent borrowers out of the equity of the home.

A recent article published by Senior Editor Thomas Brom in California Lawyer magazine shows that experts and commentators have generally reached the same conclusion about the likelihood of success of short sale programs.  Besides including quotes from me and The Subprime Shakeout regarding the allocation of losses associated with the crisis and the intransigence of originators and services that have prevented such losses from being recognized, I enjoyed Brom’s article because it does a great job of summarizing the legal implications of short sale programs.

What I would add to that discussion is that Congress’ ongoing failure to make any decision regarding who should bear the losses associated with unchecked lending means that they will still be unable to voluntarily induce servicers to go along with their new programs.  If you’ll recall, Washington tried the same thing by offering $1,000 cash incentives to servicers who would engage in a government-approved loan modification.  And we all know how well Washington’s loan modification  programs have been performing.

Besides offending any notions of fairness by paying banks to liquidate loans they improperly approved in the first place, Congress’ attempt to induce compliance by raising the cash offered by $500 smacks of a fundamental misunderstanding of the incentives and dollars at play.  Servicers often hold junior liens on these homes in the amount of 5-20% of the value of the home.  For a home valued at $300,000, that’s a lien worth anywhere from $15,000 to $60,000 for which the security interest would be wiped out if the servicer agreed to the short sale.  Is any rational utility maximizing servicer going to give that up for $1,500 cash?  What about all the late fees the servicer is raking in for every month the borrower is delinquent that the servicer would now have to forgo?  What if the servicer also owns the primary lien on the house and would have to write off tens of thousands of dollars in principal?  A quick fact check shows that the HAFA short sale program will likely suffer the same fate as those programs that came before it.  Though Congress’ heart is in the right place, it lacks either the stomach or the understanding of the situation to craft an effective solution.

As I’ve talked about before, the carrot will not work with servicers.  They are too firmly entrenched and their livelihood is too dependent on the status quo to ever expect them to voluntarily comply.  Unless Congress creates a program that clearly defines who should bear the losses associated with alternatives to foreclosures–and optimally places them square in the lap of the lenders/servicers where the loan was originated in violation of the stated guidelines–we’ll be seeing more of the same foot-dragging and lip service from the servicers that we’ve seen all along.

Posted in allocation of loss, California Lawyer, conflicts of interest, foreclosure rate, HAFA, incentives, loan modifications, servicers, short-selling, Treasury | 1 Comment