Category Archives: too big to fail

Investor End Games: All Is Not Well in the Garden

“As long as the roots are not severed, all is well.  And all will be well in the garden.” – Chance the Gardener, Being There (1979) With Judge Barbara Kapnick announcing earlier this month that the approval hearing in Bank … Continue reading →

Posted in AIG, allocation of loss, ASF, Attorneys General, Bank of New York, banks, BlackRock, Bloomberg, BofA, bondholder actions, causes of the crisis, conflicts of interest, consitutionality, contract rights, costs of the crisis, Countrywide, damages, Deutsche Bank, discovery, eminent domain, fiduciary duties, foreclosure crisis, fraud, global settlement, Grais and Ellsworth, impact of the crisis, incentives, investors, irresponsible lending, Judge Barbara Kapnick, Judge Eileen Bransten, junior liens, Kathy Patrick, lawsuits, lenders, lending guidelines, liabilities, LIBOR manipulation, liquidity, litigation, litigation costs, lobbying, MBIA, MBS, misrespresentation, monoline actions, monolines, mortgage fraud, mortgage insurers, mortgage market, negative equity, Neil Barofsky, private label MBS, procedural hurdles, putbacks, recession, rep and warranty, repurchase, Residential Capital, responsibility, restructuring, RMBS, securities, securitization, sellers and sponsors, settlements, standing, statistical sampling, statutes of limitations, successor liability, summary judgment, The Subprime Shakeout, too big to fail, toxic assets, Treasury, Trustees, underwriting guidelines, underwriting practices, US Bank, vicarious liability, waiver of rights to sue, Wall St., Walnut Place, Way Too Big to Fail, Wells Fargo, William Frey | 2 Comments

The Top 5 RMBS Cases to Watch this Summer: No. 2 – In re the Application of Bank of New York Mellon

This is the fourth installment in my countdown of the Top 5 RMBS Cases to Watch this Summer.  Click on the following links to read parts I, II, and III.  Today, we address a case that is anything but typical, … Continue reading →

Posted in accounting, allocation of loss, Attorneys General, Bank of New York, banks, BofA, bondholder actions, conflicts of interest, contract rights, damages, discovery, Freddie Mac, global settlement, improper documentation, investors, Judge Barbara Kapnick, Judge William Pauley, Judicial Opinions, lawsuits, lending guidelines, liabilities, litigation, loan files, loss causation, MBIA, MBS, pooling agreements, private label MBS, putbacks, rep and warranty, repurchase, RMBS, securities, securitization, sellers and sponsors, settlements, timeline, too big to fail, Trustees, underwriting guidelines | Tagged , | 10 Comments

Way Too Big to Fail Goes to Washington (Book Tour Day 3)

After a hiatus over the holidays, I return with Part IV of this five-part series on my experiences during a recent book tour to promote the release of Way Too Big to Fail: How Government and Private Industry Can Build … Continue reading →

Posted in Adam Levitin, bailout, balance sheets, banks, BofA, book tour, chain of title, Citigroup, conflicts of interest, Congress, foreclosure crisis, Government bailout, improper documentation, legislation, lobbying, MBS, mortgage market, negligence and recklessness, pooling agreements, regulation, Regulators, RMBS, robo-signers, Senate staffers, Servicer Safe Harbor, Timothy Geithner, too big to fail, Treasury, Way Too Big to Fail, William Frey | Leave a comment

Book Tour Day 1: Pessimism, Hope and Note Cards

My first day in New York City to promote the release of Way Too Big to Fail was a whirlwind, as expected.  I arrived into JFK at 6:00 AM and headed into Manhattan for my first stop at the Cornell … Continue reading →

Posted in Attorneys General, bailout, Dan Rather, due diligence firms, Government bailout, hedge funds, mortgage market, Neil Barofsky, putbacks, re-underwriting, Regulators, RMBS, securities, securities laws, securitization, TARP, The Subprime Shakeout, Timothy Geithner, too big to fail, Treasury, Wall St., Way Too Big to Fail, William Frey | Leave a comment

The Government Giveth and It Taketh Away: The Significance of the Game Changing FHFA Lawsuits

It is no stretch to say that Friday, September 2 was the most significant day for mortgage crisis litigation since the onset of the crisis in 2007.  That Friday, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), as conservator for Fannie Mae … Continue reading →

Posted in acquisitions, Ambac, bailout, banks, Bear Stearns, BofA, bondholder actions, Complaints, contract rights, Countrywide, damages, Deutsche Bank, emc, Fannie Mae, Federal Home Loan Banks, FHFA, Freddie Mac, freeriders, Goldman Sachs, Government bailout, investors, irresponsible lending, JPMorgan, jury trials, lawsuits, lending guidelines, liabilities, litigation, litigation costs, loan files, loss causation, loss estimates, LTV, MBS, media coverage, Merrill Lynch, misrespresentation, monoline actions, mortgage fraud, motions to dismiss, negligence and recklessness, private label MBS, procedural hurdles, putbacks, quinn emanuel, ratings agencies, rep and warranty, repurchase, RMBS, securities, securities laws, securitization, shareholder lawsuits, sole remedy, sophistication, stability, standing, statistical sampling, statutes of limitations, subpoenas, successor liability, too big to fail, Trustees, underwriting practices, Wall St., WaMu | 6 Comments

RMBS Legal Roundup: The Top Five Developments You Might Have Missed While Obsessing Over the BoNY/BofA Settlement

With interesting developments occurring almost daily in the proposed Bofa/Countrywide settlement with Bank of New York, it has been hard to focus on anything else.  Indeed, since the last time I posted on the settlement (discussing New York AG Eric … Continue reading →

Posted in AIG, Attorneys General, Bank of New York, banks, BofA, bondholder actions, CDOs, class actions, Complaints, contract rights, costs of the crisis, Credit Unions, damages, Deutsche Bank, Fannie Mae, FHFA, Freddie Mac, global settlement, Goldman Sachs, investigations, investors, JPMorgan, lawsuits, litigation, loss causation, MBS, misrespresentation, mortgage market, motions to dismiss, NCUA, Paulson and Co., private label MBS, probes, procedural hurdles, research, reserve reporting, responsibility, RMBS, SEC, securities fraud, securitization, settlements, sophistication, standing, subpoenas, subprime, too big to fail, Treasury, Trustees, Uncategorized, Wall St. | 2 Comments

Barron’s Article Pulls No Punches in Assessing Bank Putback Liability

If you’re looking for a great primer on the latest developments in the legal saga over who will ultimately bear the losses for the detritus that passed as subprime and Alt-A mortgage loans from 2004 to 2007, check out this … Continue reading →

Posted in allocation of loss, Barron's, Clayton Holdings, Lehman Brothers, loan files, private label MBS, rep and warranty, repurchase, responsibility, stated income, too big to fail, underwriting practices | 2 Comments

Treasury Official Speaks Out About Excessive Risk Taking

At long last, someone in Washington is speaking out about the dangerous precedent set by the government bailouts of major banks. As discussed in this article on the financial regulations website FinReg21, Treasury secretary Michael Barr testified before the House … Continue reading →

Posted in bailout, executive compensation, Fannie Mae, Federal Reserve, Freddie Mac, Government bailout, incentives, Judiciary Committee, Lehman Brothers, Michael Barr, moral hazard, too big to fail, Treasury | Leave a comment