Category Archives: mortgage market

Cracks in Commercial Real Estate Market Usher in All-Too-Familiar CMBS Putback Litigation and Risk of Broader Distress

Posted on March 23, 2026 by Isaac Gradman

It has been said that history repeats itself. This is perhaps not quite correct; it merely rhymes. – Theodor Reik, 1965, Curiosities of the Self: Illusions We Have about Ourselves  I am reminded frequently of the above quote when I … Continue reading →

Posted in allocation of loss, banks, bondholder actions, bondholders, borrower fraud, broader credit crisis, Certificateholders, Chetrit, CMBS, contract rights, CRE, Deloitte and Touche, Fannie Mae, fraud, Freddie Mac, interest rates, investors, JPMorgan, lawsuits, liabilities, litigation, MBS, misrespresentation, mortgage fraud, mortgage market, pre-investment due diligence, putbacks, re-underwriting, rep and warranty, repurchase, responsibility, securities, securitization, sellers and sponsors, servicers, statutes of limitations, The Subprime Shakeout, underwriting practices | Tagged , , , | Leave a comment

Investor End Games: All Is Not Well in the Garden

Posted on August 29, 2012 by Isaac Gradman

“As long as the roots are not severed, all is well.  And all will be well in the garden.” – Chance the Gardener, Being There (1979) With Judge Barbara Kapnick announcing earlier this month that the approval hearing in Bank … Continue reading →

Posted in AIG, allocation of loss, ASF, Attorneys General, Bank of New York, banks, BlackRock, Bloomberg, BofA, bondholder actions, causes of the crisis, conflicts of interest, consitutionality, contract rights, costs of the crisis, Countrywide, damages, Deutsche Bank, discovery, eminent domain, fiduciary duties, foreclosure crisis, fraud, global settlement, Grais and Ellsworth, impact of the crisis, incentives, investors, irresponsible lending, Judge Barbara Kapnick, Judge Eileen Bransten, junior liens, Kathy Patrick, lawsuits, lenders, lending guidelines, liabilities, LIBOR manipulation, liquidity, litigation, litigation costs, lobbying, MBIA, MBS, misrespresentation, monoline actions, monolines, mortgage fraud, mortgage insurers, mortgage market, negative equity, Neil Barofsky, private label MBS, procedural hurdles, putbacks, recession, rep and warranty, repurchase, Residential Capital, responsibility, restructuring, RMBS, securities, securitization, sellers and sponsors, settlements, standing, statistical sampling, statutes of limitations, successor liability, summary judgment, The Subprime Shakeout, too big to fail, toxic assets, Treasury, Trustees, underwriting guidelines, underwriting practices, US Bank, vicarious liability, waiver of rights to sue, Wall St., Walnut Place, Way Too Big to Fail, Wells Fargo, William Frey | 2 Comments

The Top 5 RMBS Cases to Watch this Summer: No. 5 – Syncora v. EMC

Posted on June 11, 2012 by Isaac Gradman

As summer approaches and the weather turns warmer, RMBS litigation is also heating up, generating long-awaited precedent that will dictate how mortgage losses are likely to be allocated by the courts.  In order to keep my readers apprised on what … Continue reading →

Posted in Alison Frankel, allocation of loss, Bank of New York, banks, Bear Stearns, broader credit crisis, contract rights, costs of the crisis, Countrywide, emc, investors, JPMorgan, Judge Eileen Bransten, Judge Paul Crotty, Judicial Opinions, lawsuits, lending guidelines, liabilities, litigation, loss causation, loss estimates, monoline actions, monolines, mortgage market, private label MBS, putbacks, rep and warranty, repurchase, responsibility, RMBS, subprime, The Subprime Shakeout, Trustees, underwriting guidelines, underwriting practices | 12 Comments

Guest Post: The Migratory Patterns of Yield-Hungry Investors

Posted on April 12, 2012 by Isaac Gradman

Editor’s Note: in this guest post, former bond insurance insider Steve Ruterman discusses important considerations for investing in private label MBS beyond credit risk analysis, including how investors can benefit from understanding the differences in servicer behavior and business models.  … Continue reading →

Posted in Attorneys General, bondholder actions, conflicts of interest, firing servicers, foreclosure rate, guest posts, hedge funds, incentives, investors, junior liens, loan modifications, loan seasoning, MBIA, MBS, moral hazard, mortgage market, pre-investment due diligence, private label MBS, projecting risk adjusted returns, putbacks, regulation, Regulators, servicer defaults, servicer reports, servicers, subprime | Leave a comment

Under AG Foreclosure Settlement, Servicers Get Credit for Things They’re Supposed to Do

Posted on April 10, 2012 by Isaac Gradman

Last week, District Court Judge Rosemary Collyer approved the Attorney General Foreclosure Settlement (“AGFS”) without a hearing, and without any objection from investors.  According to the Judge, the Consent Judgment between the nation’s five largest servicers and the Attorneys General … Continue reading →

Posted in Adam Levitin, Ally Bank, Attorneys General, auditing, bailout, Bank of New York, banks, BofA, Citigroup, conflicts of interest, contract rights, costs of the crisis, Countrywide, damages, foreclosure crisis, foreclosure rate, global settlement, homeowner relief, improper documentation, incentives, investors, JPMorgan, junior liens, liabilities, MBS, mortgage market, Neil Barofsky, pooling agreements, press, private label MBS, RMBS, robo-signers, servicer defaults, servicers, settlements, Wells Fargo | 2 Comments

Is Foreclosure Settlement Déjà Vu All Over Again?

Posted on February 9, 2012 by Isaac Gradman

Today, the Attorneys General of 49 states (with Oklahoma being the lone holdout) announced a record $26 billion settlement with the nation’s five largest servicers over false and fraudulent foreclosure practices like robosigning.  That big number looks great on paper, … Continue reading →

Posted in allocation of loss, Attorneys General, bailout, banks, BofA, consitutionality, contract rights, costs of the crisis, Countrywide, education, foreclosure crisis, global settlement, Government bailout, Greenwich Financial Services, Helping Families Save Homes, homeowner relief, improper documentation, incentives, investigations, investors, irresponsible lending, junior liens, lenders, liabilities, loan modifications, lobbying, MBS, media coverage, moral hazard, mortgage market, predatory lending, press, private label MBS, probes, public perceptions, Regulators, RMBS, robo-signers, securitization, Servicer Safe Harbor, servicers, settlements, sophistication, subprime, Takings Clause, The Subprime Shakeout, Way Too Big to Fail, William Frey, workouts | 13 Comments

Way Too Big to Fail Goes to Washington (Book Tour Day 3)

Posted on January 23, 2012 by Isaac Gradman

After a hiatus over the holidays, I return with Part IV of this five-part series on my experiences during a recent book tour to promote the release of Way Too Big to Fail: How Government and Private Industry Can Build … Continue reading →

Posted in Adam Levitin, bailout, balance sheets, banks, BofA, book tour, chain of title, Citigroup, conflicts of interest, Congress, foreclosure crisis, Government bailout, improper documentation, legislation, lobbying, MBS, mortgage market, negligence and recklessness, pooling agreements, regulation, Regulators, RMBS, robo-signers, Senate staffers, Servicer Safe Harbor, Timothy Geithner, too big to fail, Treasury, Way Too Big to Fail, William Frey | Leave a comment

WTBTF Book Tour Day 2: Meeting, Marketing and Mentoring in Manhattan

Posted on November 15, 2011 by Isaac Gradman

I woke Tuesday morning, Nov. 8 on the second day of the Way Too Big to Fail book tour to the news that Kathy Patrick, legal architect of Bank of America’s Hail Mary Countrywide settlement (background here and here), had … Continue reading →

Posted in BlackRock, Bloomberg, BofA, book tour, Countrywide, foreclosure rate, Fox News, Greenwich Financial Services, investors, Kathy Patrick, litigation, loan modifications, loss causation, MBIA, MBS, media coverage, Morgan Stanley, mortgage market, MSNBC, PIMCO, Presentations, Regulators, The Subprime Shakeout, Uncategorized, Way Too Big to Fail, William Frey | Leave a comment

Book Tour Day 1: Pessimism, Hope and Note Cards

Posted on November 8, 2011 by Isaac Gradman

My first day in New York City to promote the release of Way Too Big to Fail was a whirlwind, as expected.  I arrived into JFK at 6:00 AM and headed into Manhattan for my first stop at the Cornell … Continue reading →

Posted in Attorneys General, bailout, Dan Rather, due diligence firms, Government bailout, hedge funds, mortgage market, Neil Barofsky, putbacks, re-underwriting, Regulators, RMBS, securities, securities laws, securitization, TARP, The Subprime Shakeout, Timothy Geithner, too big to fail, Treasury, Wall St., Way Too Big to Fail, William Frey | Leave a comment

Release of “Way Too Big to Fail” Simply Opening Salvo in Efforts to Reform Mortgage Finance

Posted on November 7, 2011 by Isaac Gradman

It’s tempting when you have an enormous task before you to focus all of your attention on completing that task while blocking out any thoughts of what comes next.  For me, that enormous task has been the publication of a … Continue reading →

Posted in allocation of loss, appeals, Bank of New York, banks, BofA, bondholder actions, causes of the crisis, contract rights, Countrywide, discovery, FHFA, global settlement, investors, irresponsible lending, lawsuits, liabilities, litigation, lobbying, loss causation, MBIA, monoline actions, mortgage market, pooling agreements, private label MBS, putbacks, regulation, Regulators, remand, repurchase, RMBS, securitization, settlements, statistical sampling, successor liability, The Subprime Shakeout, Uncategorized, Way Too Big to Fail, William Frey | 1 Comment